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I.

Introduction
This paper examines the influences of both market structure and of firm or product characteristics on the launch of new drugs in the largest pharmaceutical markets, the G7 nations.
Despite the incentives to amortize large and sunk development costs over many markets, only one-third of the prescription pharmaceuticals sold in one of these countries (the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and Canada) are also marketed in the other six. Economic theory suggests that entry is a function of market size, the level of competition, and the fixed costs associated with product launch. Research in strategic management suggests that firms are heterogeneous: some are better suited to a particular market than others. Joint testing of economic and strategic hypotheses is rare, largely because it requires a setting with a clear set of potential entrants and separate markets. Disentangling these various effects is an empirical challenge, but one for which this setting is ideal. An identical product is launched (or not launched) in different markets, yielding three sources of variance to exploit: variation across countries, variation across therapeutic classes, and changes over time.
Besides the obvious effects on available medical treatments in a country, there are a number of reasons why the entry patterns of new pharmaceuticals are important. Understanding them may provide insights into the diffusion of other new technologies, particularly those characterized by large development costs, relatively low marginal or transportation costs, and that are susceptible to creative destruction by subsequent innovators. In addition, identifying the sources of competitive advantage in this industry has implications for industry structure and, perhaps, the regulation of entry within a country, as well as managerial decisions such as the choice of a licensing partner.
The main results are as follows. First, market characteristics such as population, wealth, price control regulation, and competition generally have the expected effects. Correct adjustment for market size is crucial, though. The importance of therapies varies substantially across countries, and failure to account for this heterogeneity in estimation leads to biased and misleading results about the effect of competition. Market characteristics alone correctly predict market entry for only about 30% of the sample. Including firm characteristics improves this prediction substantially. The home country effect is particularly strong, as is a firm's local experience and multinational status.
Importantly, similarities between the country of headquarters and the target country, in particular a common border or language, greatly increase the likelihood of product launch. In fact, entry is more likely to occur from a small firm in a neighboring country than by a multinational firm, all else equal. This suggests that the match between the innovating firm and the target country is a critical component of profitability.
The following section gives a brief overview of the pharmaceutical industry and presents the rationale for examining market, firm, and product characteristics from the literature on empirical studies of entry and on the economics of pharmaceuticals. The empirical model is explained in Section III. Section IV describes the data used in this research. Results are presented in Section V, and Section VI concludes.
II. Description of Industry and the Determinants of Entry
Expenditures on health care range from 5% of GDP in South Korea to over 13% in the US, and the share of pharmaceutical sales in total health expenditures account for anywhere from 4%
in the US to nearly 18% in France and Italy. The US is the largest single market at $97 billion of annual revenue; the five largest European markets amount to $51 billion, as does Japan.
1 Table 1 provides revenues from the major markets and the distribution of revenues across broad therapeutic classifications. This table illustrates that the importance of certain therapies can vary substantially across countries. For example, nearly 22% of revenues in the US derive from drugs for the central nervous system, while in Japan this figure is only about 6%. Italian expenditures on anti-infectives are over twice those of the UK. These markets also differ on a number of other dimensions, of which regulation is the most notable. The entry of pharmaceuticals is restricted by the Food and Drug Administration in the US or an equivalent agency in other countries. The price of drugs is also regulated in most countries, including four of the G7 markets. For a more detailed description of price controls, see Jacobzone (2000) or Kyle (2003) .
The industry is highly fragmented: there are thousands of small firms around the world, only several hundred of which are research-based and have brought at least one drug to market. About forty multinational firms dominate the market. These firms, listed in Table 2, are responsible for half of all drugs available somewhere in the world and spent over $44 billion on research and development in 1999. Table 3 lists the number of firms in each major market, the number of drugs they have developed, and the average number of countries to which those drugs diffuse.
The US is the origin of over a quarter of all drugs, and these products reach an average of about nine markets. Though many drugs are invented in Japan, they are launched in fewer foreign markets. Drugs with small domestic markets like Denmark, Switzerland, and the Netherlands spread to more foreign markets than drugs with large home markets. Several general findings emerge from the literature on entry. Both market size and the degree of competition influence the entry decision. The number of firms in equilibrium increases at a decreasing rate with the size of the market, and profit margins fall as the number of competitors increases (Bresnahan and Reiss (1987 , 1990 , Berry (1992) , Scott Morton (1999)). Second, firms tend to enter in markets that are similar to those they already compete in. Berry (1992) shows airlines that serve one or both of the cities in a city pair market are more likely to enter that market. Scott Morton (1999) demonstrates that generic drug firms in the US tend to enter product markets that match well to their existing products. Finally, the match between a product and a market is important. For example, Mazzeo (2002) finds that competing motels strategically differentiate themselves from each other in quality space to soften price competition. All these studies of entry have the distinct advantage of requiring little or no data on price and quantity, which is often expensive and difficult to obtain. However, these authors relied on a single crosssection of markets, which precludes simultaneous consideration of market, firm, and product characteristics.
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Many prior studies on the pharmaceutical industry identify factors that should be important in the decision to launch a new drug. Competition in pharmaceuticals exists both within a chemical (branded versus generic, prescription versus over-the-counter) and between different chemicals that treat the same condition. The generic segment garners significant market share within a few years of patent expiration when entry occurs, but not all therapeutic classes (and very few countries) attract such entry. 6 While many have shown that generic competition has indisputable significance (at least in the US), there is substantial justification for focusing on competition between drugs. In a recent paper, Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) Toivanen and Waterson (2001) observe entry decisions over time into fast-food markets in the UK, but like Berry (1992) , assume all heterogeneity is at the firm level. 6 Generic competition in the US is the focus of Caves et al. (1991) and Grabowski and Vernon (1992) , among others. Hudson (2000) looks at the determinants of generic entry in the US, the UK, Germany, and Japan. Ellison et al. (1997) , who estimate demand for a class of antibiotics, and Berndt et al. (1997) , who examine the antiulcer market, consider competition both within and between drugs.
consistent with other studies that emphasize the importance of intermolecular competition, such as Stern (1996) and Berndt et al. (1997) . In the context of a study on the diffusion of innovation, the creative destruction of intermolecular competition is more interesting than generic competition, which exists only for older drugs.
In addition to competition, the regulatory environment has a significant bearing on prevailing prices Chao (2000a, 2000b) ) and entry costs (Djankov et al. (2002) ). Countries with stringent regulation of entry combined with relatively little price regulation, such as the US and the UK, have highly concentrated domestic industries whose products diffuse more extensively into foreign markets (Thomas (1994) ). The one study that explicitly addresses international entry (Parker (1984) ) shows regulation is related to large differences across countries in the number and mix of products introduced before 1978. Thus, there is much reason to expect regulation to influence entry.
Regulation also affects drugs and firms differentially within a country, particularly in the costs of gaining regulatory approval (Dranove and Meltzer (1994), Carpenter (2003) ). Product characteristics, like therapeutic novelty or indication, and firm characteristics, such as experience with the FDA and domestic status, are related to the speed at which a new drug receives regulatory approval in the US. Data from three other large pharmaceutical markets (the UK, France, and Germany) displays a similar pattern in time-to-market of important drugs, and reveals a strong home country advantage: the drugs of domestic firms are approved earlier than those of foreign firms. Beyond the non-uniform effects of regulation, there is substantial evidence of significant firm and product heterogeneity in research productivity (Henderson and Cockburn (1996) and Henderson (1994, 1998) ), and Scott Morton (1999) finds evidence of important firm-specific differences in the entry decisions of generic drug firms. Firm-specific costs are therefore likely to be important in drug launches.
III. Model
The model used in this paper assumes that potential entrants for a market take existing market structure as given and compete simultaneously in time t. Let i index drugs, j index firms, k index therapeutic classes, and l index countries. A market is thus a class-country-year triple. Define the reduced-form profit function as
where N is the number of competing drugs in the market, M is the number of potential entrants, X is a vector of market characteristics, Z is a vector of firm characteristics, and W is a vector of drug characteristics.
7 Firms enter if their expected profits are at least zero, and any firm that elects not to enter must expect negative profits from entry. The probability that a firm expects positive profits, and therefore chooses to enter, is This model may also be thought of as a discrete-time hazard model. The probability that a drug is launched during a time interval t can be written as
where a(t) is a series of intercepts for each year of a drug's age (or time at risk). A convenient transformation for estimation is the logit, i.e.
This method has the advantage of being quite flexible as well as accounting for rightcensored observations. This estimation approach requires several strong assumptions. To include N as an explanatory variable, we must assume that one drug's entry does not induce another's exit. The justification for such an assumption is provided in Section V. If M is included and treated as an exogenous variable, then the threat of future competition is allowed to affect current entry decisions, but one must believe that firms do not behave strategically. This assumption is highly suspect. The number of drugs developed to treat a condition is almost certainly a function of the global profits associated with that disease. Firms in an oligopolistic setting (which most drug markets are) are very likely to react to the behavior of their competitors.
An alternative to the discrete-time logit is a continuous-time hazard model. Since drug launches are observed at annual intervals in this dataset, a discrete-time model is probably most appropriate. As the interval of observation becomes small, the results from a discrete-time logit converge to those from a proportional hazard model, 8 and the results from a continuous-time hazard model are quite similar to the discrete-time results presented here.
Despite the strong and sometimes uncomfortable assumptions necessary, estimating a static reduced-form model can provide insights into the sources of unobserved heterogeneity that may 7 Product quality is considered exogenous. Once a drug has been developed and tested, its efficacy is fixed: a firm cannot re-position a low-quality drug as a high-quality product. In reality, some "tweaking" is possible, such as once-a-day dosing formulations, but such changes are second order. 8 See Amemiya (1985 ), pp. 433-455, or Allison (1984 for a more complete discussion of duration models.
inform future research. In particular, these models are numerically stable and robust enough to estimate a large number of coefficients and fixed effects, which is a far greater challenge in a structural setting such as that of Berry (1992) . The estimation here offers several advantages over previous work. The set of potential entrants is clear, so the dependent variable is reliably defined.
Unlike most previous studies, which use a single cross-section, the panel structure of this dataset permits a much richer set of controls. It is also one of few studies to focus on the entry patterns of highly R&D-intensive products, the management of which is likely to be quite different from single-outlet, local firms with relatively undifferentiated products.
IV. Data
Information on all drugs developed between 1980 and 2000 is obtained from the Pharmaprojects database, which is maintained by the UK consulting firm PJB Publications. This dataset includes the drug's chemical and brand names, the name and nationality of the firm that developed it, the identity of licensees, the country and year in which it was patented, its status ( The OECD Health Data 2000 dataset provides population, GDP, data on access to health care, and other demographic information for the G7 markets considered here. The regulatory structure of each country is classified as "price control regime" using the summary tables from Jacobzone's "Pharmaceutical Policies in OECD Countries: Reconciling Social and Industrial
Goals." Canada, France, Italy, and Japan are price-controlled countries; the US, UK, and Germany do not use explicit price controls.
A market is defined as a country-therapeutic class-year triple. This definition assumes that drugs with the same therapeutic classification are substitutes, and that there is no substitution between therapeutic classes. In addition, this market definition requires that there be no trade in unapproved products across international borders: launching a drug in the US must not enable access to the Canadian market. While the move to a common market in Europe weakens the assumption of separate markets, negotiation with health ministries is still necessary for the drug to be reimbursed. Competition from drugs approved in nearby countries but without local insurance coverage is probably weak.
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A drug is "at risk" for entry into all markets beginning in the year of its first launch into any country. After launch in a market, it drops out of the risk set for that country. Any drug that has been approved somewhere in the world for a particular therapeutic class is a potential entrant into that therapeutic class in all other countries. This set excludes drugs currently under development for that therapeutic class, for which outcomes are extremely uncertain and regulatory approval may be years away. In estimation, the dependent variable is entry into the drug's primary therapeutic class, although the drug is considered a competitor in all of the therapeutic classes to which it is assigned. In general, exit is rare, since a drug may continue to be an important therapy even after its patent expires, especially in nations without a significant generic segment. While a firm may reduce its advertising efforts for a particular drug, it generally does not withdraw the product from a market. It is therefore assumed that there is no exit for economic reasons.
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Possible obsolescence is controlled for in the estimation by allowing older drugs to have a different impact on entry than newer therapies.
Drug quality, or the therapeutic advance a treatment represents, is likely an important factor in both the fixed costs of entry (if regulators accelerate approval of breakthrough therapies, or if regulatory approval is more difficult to obtain for a novel type of therapy with which regulators are unfamiliar) and in variable profits. Unfortunately, objective measures of quality are difficult to obtain. Previous studies have used the ratings of therapeutic novelty assigned by the FDA upon application for approval, but these are unavailable for drugs that did not seek entry into the US. The "Essential Drug List" of the World Health Organization is another possibility, but it is updated infrequently and most of the drugs on the list are more than twenty years old. Therefore, this research follows Dranove and Meltzer (1994) in using Medline citations; the construction of variables using citations is described in Appendix B. Other aspects of drug quality are the number and severity of adverse interactions and side effects, dosage form, and dosage frequency.
Systematic data on these characteristics is unavailable, particularly for drugs not marketed in the US.
Quantifying the regulatory barrier to entry, as well as the severity of price regulation, is nearly impossible. One indication is the time between application and approval of a drug.
However, not only is this unavailable in all markets, but is also likely to be a function of drug 9 There is evidence that "gray market" trade in pharmaceuticals across borders has been increasing, however. See OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition (2001) . 10 However, Lichtenberg and Philipson present evidence that 18% of the drugs approved between 1970 and 1979 in the US are no longer marketed in 1999.
quality, firm characteristics, the number of other drugs under review, and perhaps the decisions of regulators in other countries, and is therefore an imperfect measure. Other omitted variables include the importance of generic competition within a country (or therapeutic class), the degree to which marketing of pharmaceuticals is regulated, the cost of marketing in each country, heterogeneity in prescribing behavior, and other subtle but important distinctions between countries. These effects are subsumed in the country fixed effects included in some specifications, with the unfortunate implication that the estimated fixed effect for each country is the net impact of many variables. country-class-year markets. There were 80028 entry opportunities, only 3310 (4.14%) of which had a product launch. The mean number of drugs competing in markets with entry opportunities is 1.8. Figure 1 shows the distribution across therapeutic classes within several countries over 1980-2000. Most markets are highly concentrated, and over one-fourth have no entry at all.
Over 28% of all potential markets are empty in the US, even though it accounts for twice the revenues of Japan and Europe. The large fraction of "0" markets reflects both that some drugs are never launched in a country and that some drugs are only introduced years after they first become available elsewhere. However, even as of 2000, 15% of markets are empty.
Variables measured at the drug-year level include age, the number of countries in which the drug has been introduced, and its importance as measured by its share of total Medline citations within its therapeutic class. The probability of entry is expected to be concave in the number of launch countries if there are economies of scale in global production, as clinical trial data is accumulated and used in subsequent applications, or if regulators are exposed to less political risk in approving a drug that has already been accepted by their counterparts in other countries. A positive coefficient is expected on the importance measure, either because important drugs are more profitable or because regulators respond to political pressures and approve them more quickly.
Several firm-level variables are included. A firm with a presence in many markets may have more resources to draw on, which would make entry more likely. The dummy variable "multinational" (defined here as a firm active in at least 10 countries) captures this effect. A firm's experience in a country is defined as the count of drugs it markets in that country, and its experience in a therapeutic class is the count of other drugs it produces for that class. These capture economies of scope: experience with the regulator and the presence of a detailing force and distribution channels may be spread across all a firm's products within a country, and there may be benefits to specialization within a therapeutic class. The number of drugs a firm has within a country-class market measures expertise in the local market.
All firm variables apply to the innovating firm, which may license a drug to another firm for marketing in particular countries. If licensing were completely efficient, then the characteristics of the innovating firm would be irrelevant; only the market and product characteristics should matter. To the extent that licensing markets work well, this specification is biased against finding any significance on firm-level variables.
Three additional dummy variables capture similarities between the country of headquarters of the originating firm and the target country; these indicate whether the headquarters country shares a border, language, or regulatory structure with the potential market. Firms may prefer to enter markets that share characteristics with their home market, with which they are likely to be most familiar. This could stem from a better understanding of neighboring culture, easier communication, or familiarity with regulations. (Sharing a border may also be related to lower transportation costs, though in the case of pharmaceuticals such costs are usually trivial.) If labor markets were completely efficient, a firm could hire managers with the necessary language skills or experience in the target country; in this case, the coefficients on these variables should be zero.
Finally, country-level demographics provide rough measures of market size and demand.
Ideally, incidence rates at the level of country-class would be included, but these are difficult to obtain and may also be endogenous if pharmaceuticals reduce the occurrence of disease. In general, additional country-level variables such as the number of doctors per capita, pharmaceutical spending, and life expectancy proved insignificant 11 and so only a parsimonious set of variables is presented here. Specifications that include country-therapeutic class fixed effects control for other unobserved market characteristics.
V. Results
Results of discrete-time logit models are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . All specifications include drug age, year, and therapeutic class fixed effects, the coefficients of which are not reported; Models 4-6 include country-therapeutic class interactions. not surprising that population and per capita GDP are not especially important determinants of entry for this set. 12 In the specification that includes only country characteristics, the coefficients on population and its square have the expected signs, but the coefficient on GDP is not statistically different from zero. However, the use of price controls appears to discourage entry.
At the median of all continuous variables, price controls decrease the probability of entry by 19%.
The parameter estimates for variables capturing the extent of competition in Table 5 demonstrate the consequences of mismeasuring market size. The probability of entry appears to be increasing in the number of current competitors in specifications that control only for year and therapeutic class effects. Such an interpretation overlooks the fact that the number of drugs in a market reflects underlying country-specific demand for a therapy, which is inadequately captured by population and wealth. As an example, consider lafutidine, a new antiulcer medication developed by a Belgian company, which was launched in Japan but not in the US. While quite a large market in both countries, Japan already had 18 antiulcer treatments, compared to 9 in the US. However, the Japanese have a much higher rate of stomach cancers and other gastrointestinal disorders, 13 so demand for antiulcer drugs is especially large relative to other countries. Without accounting for the difference in demand for antiulcer treatments between these two countries, one would erroneously conclude that entry is more likely in markets with more competition.
If country-therapeutic class interactions are included, as in Models 4-6, the coefficient on the number of competitors -both recent entrants and older drugs -is negative and significant.
Competition from older drugs appears to have an even greater impact, perhaps because brandname capital takes time to develop or because doctors have "sticky" prescribing habits. The coefficients on the squared terms of the number of competitors are positive, indicating that the decline in expected profits is steeper when the number of competing drugs is low. This is to be expected: if each drug takes 1/N of the market, where N is the number of drugs, then moving from monopoly to duopoly is a greater loss of profits than the difference between nine and ten competitors. Markets with many potential competitors experience more entry, which is consistent with the hypothesis that firms have heterogeneous costs. Such markets get more idiosyncratic draws from the distribution of firm fixed costs and therefore experience more actual entry in expectation.
12 Market size and wealth have much greater effects when estimated on a sample of countries with more variance. See Kyle (2003) . 13 Source: Merck Manual. Table 6 displays parameter estimates for firm and product characteristics included in Models 2, 3, 5, and 6. These coefficients are fairly robust across all specifications. Profits appear to be concave in the number of countries in which a drug has been launched. This result is consistent with firms introducing their products first in the most profitable countries, and with economies of scope from clinical trials or other data required for regulatory approval common to many countries. The probability of entry is increasing in its importance: the larger a drug's share of the citations in its therapeutic class, the more likely its launch.
More interestingly, the diffusion of a new drug depends largely on the characteristics of its originator. The percentage of correct predictions of entry increases from 31% to 58% when firm characteristics and interactions with market characteristics are included for models without country-class fixed effects, and from 51% to 64% for models with them. Experience in a country increases the likelihood of entry. On average, marketing three additional drugs in a country offsets the effect of competing with one additional drug. This suggests economies of scope in local distribution through familiarity with the regulator or the establishment of marketing and distribution forces. However, it is impossible in this model to distinguish whether the firm has exogenously low fixed costs in a given country, and therefore introduces more products, or whether it achieves lower costs through economies of scope. Entry is less likely if the firm has a larger number of drugs in its portfolio or if it already markets a drug in the same countrytherapeutic class market; these effects are of little economic significance.
Particularly striking is the importance of domestic status. The probability of launch in the home country of the firm is 3.4 times greater than the average. A firm may have relatively low fixed costs in its domestic market for many reasons; perhaps it receives some favoritism by the local regulator, is allowed more generous pricing in the interest of keeping the domestic industry strong, or enjoys superior marketing ability in its native environment. Alternatively, domestic firms may be most familiar with the therapeutic needs of their home country, and therefore concentrate their drug development in those areas. Japanese firms have developed many of the antiulcer treatments available today in response to the local demand for such products, to continue with the example used earlier.
Similarities between a firm's home market and the target country appear to be quite important in the entry decision. Sharing a border and a language increases the probability of entry by 53%
at the median of all continuous variables based on the estimates from Model 3, though the effect of a common language is not estimated precisely if country-therapeutic class fixed effects are included. In other words, these similarities provide almost half of the advantages associated with domestic status. Note that the coefficients on country-of-origin are insignificant when these measures of similarities are included.
These similarity effects are present even for multinational firms. In specifications that include interactions of the multinational dummy with all other variables, the effect of a shared language or border for multinationals is one-third to one-half the size of the coefficient for small local firms, but still large and significant. The estimated home country advantage for multinationals is about 41% the size of that for local firms. Thus, even the largest pharmaceutical firms with a global presence prefer to stay as to close to home, in some sense, as possible. These effects are illustrated in Figure 2 , which shows the predicted probability of entry for foreign firms with no shared language or border, multinational firms, "similar" firms, and domestic firms over the range of continuous firm-level variables and at the median of all market-level variables.
The importance of some variables differs from country to country. Table 7 presents results for specifications estimated by a drug's country of origin. The coefficients on domestic status in Italy and Japan are significantly larger than those for other countries; in fact, domestic status has a negative effect in the US. In addition, the effect of similarities in regulatory structure, which is estimated imprecisely in the specifications using the full sample, becomes clearer. Swiss, French, and Italian firms seek launch in free-pricing countries with a different regulatory structure than their home markets. US and UK firms, whose domestic markets lack price controls, prefer similar free-pricing markets, and shared language or borders matter much less.
VI. Conclusion
This paper integrates predictions of economic theory with the views of strategic management in considering the relative impacts of firm and market characteristics on the entry patterns of pharmaceuticals. It finds that expected profits decline in the number of competitors provided that market-specific demand is controlled for. Thus, results are consistent with predictions of industrial organization oligopoly models and the findings of previous studies of entry. Price controls are estimated to have a negative effect on entry, and drug characteristics are related to profits in expected ways. In addition, there is evidence of economies of scale in global production and economies of scope within a market. Firm characteristics, such as experience in a country and domestic status, are found to have an enormous bearing on the diffusion of a new drug.
While both market structure and firm/product characteristics have substantial effects on the entry pattern of a new drug, this research demonstrates that the interaction between them is crucial. Similarities between a firm's home market and a potential launch market greatly increase the probability of launch; a common border and language provides about half the advantage of domestic status. In addition, the relative salience of domestic status varies across countries, and price controls have differential impacts on firms headquartered in different countries. This is an important dimension of entry that most previous research has been unable to address.
There are several important implications for public policy from this research. Price controls appear to reduce the probability of a new drug's entry. The costs of deterring existing products, over and above the possible long-run effects on incentives to invest in costly R&D and the development of future products, should be balanced against any short-run savings from lower prices. Second, these results demonstrate that domestic firms are able to access their local markets at a lower cost than are foreign firms and that the advantage of domestic status varies across countries. While it is possible that local firms develop treatments for local needs more efficiently than foreign firms, an industrial policy that favors the drugs of domestic firms may result in crowding out of superior foreign products. This research also demonstrates the importance of understanding local pharmaceutical markets. The match between an innovating firm and the local market appears to be a critical aspect of profitability. The findings suggest that there are gains from licensing to domestic firms or to firms with a large presence in a market.
These results indicate that there are important sources of competitive advantage that merit additional exploration. More information about pharmaceutical firms, such as their financial health, their patenting activities, and their licensing practices, would be very valuable. Future work should also incorporate better measures of country-specific demand and costs associated with product launch, such as indicators of regulatory stringency and advertising. Lastly, a structural approach that addresses the problem of endogenous entry by competitors and examines the nature of competition in these markets may be appropriate. 
